1 Throughout this paper, Latin America is used as a shorthand for Latin America and the Caribbean.
2 Dr. R. Evan Ellis has been a leading voice in this arena for over a decade. See US National Security Implications of Chinese Involvement in Latin America (US Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, 2005), China-Latin America: Good Will, Good Business, and Strategic Position (US Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, 2011), and his latest book, China on the Ground in Latin America: Challenges for the Chinese and Impacts on the Region (Palgrave Macmillan, 2014).
3 Loretta Napoleoni, Maonomics: Why Chinese Communists Make Better Capitalists Than We Do, (Perth: University of Western Australia, 2011).
4 Andrew Szamosszegi and Cole Kyle, An Analysis of State-Owned Enterprises and State Capitalism in China (Washington, DC: US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, October 21, 2011).
5 National Bureau of Statistics, China Statistical Yearbook, (Beijing, 2013).
6 See Enrique Dussel Peters, “The “Omnipresence” of China’s Public Sector? Initial Reflections for a Debate and Understanding of China’s Socioeconomic Performance from a Latin American Perspective,” in Enrique Dussel Peters and Ariel Armony, eds., Latin America-China Beyond Raw Materials. Who Are the Actors? (Nueva Sociedad, UNAM-CECHIMEX, Buenos Aires/México, forthcoming in 2015).
7 International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook (April 2015).
8 See, for example, Boston Consulting Group’s global manufacturing cost-competitiveness index that compares the world’s twenty-five leading manufacturing exporting economies. From this analysis, Mexico is cheaper than China in manufacturing, and China has increasingly upgraded and specialized in higher wage segments of value-added chains. Boston Consulting Group, “The Shifting Economics of Global Manufacturing. How Cost Competitiveness Is Changing Worldwide,” 2014.
9 Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China, “China’s Policy Paper on Latin America and the Caribbean,” 2008, http://www.gov.cn/english/official/2008-11/05/content_1140347.htm.
10 Keqiang Li, “Crear juntos un nuevo porvenir de la Asociación de Cooperación IntegrNapoleoni, Loretta entre China y América Latina y el Caribe,” presentation at the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, Santiago de Chile, May 25, 2015.
11 For more information about the proposed Nicaraguan canal, see Danielle Renwick, “Nicaragua’s Grand Canal,” Council on Foreign Relations, April 24, 2015, http://www.cfr.org/infrastructure/nicaraguas-grand-canal/p36468.
12 CELAC, China-CELAC Forum Cooperation Plan (2015-2019), 2015, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1227318.shtml.
13 Li, 2015.
14 ECLAC, 2015, http://www.cepal.org/en/datos-y-estadisticas; RED ALC-CHINA (Red Académica de América Latina y el Caribe sobre China). Four volumes. RED ALC-CHINA, UDUAL, México, 2013 (Cechimex, The Center for China-Mexico Studies, Department of Economics, National Autonomous University of Mexico, 2015, http://220.127.116.11/deschimex/cechimex/index.php/es/estadisticas).
15 United Nations COMTRADE Database, http://comtrade.un.org/.
17 ECLAC, 2015.
18 United Nations COMTRADE Database, http://comtrade.un.org/.
19 ECLAC 2015. Chinese OFDI statistics also differ substantially depending on the specific source. The National Bureau of Statistics (NBS 2014) in China, for example, registers $77.6 billion Chinese OFDI during 2005-13 or $7.7 billion annually in average (and much less than ECLAC, as mentioned above). However, out of these $77.6 billion, Cayman Islands and Virgin Islands account for 87.38 percent of China’s OFDI in Latin American and the Caribbean, i.e., according to this official source, China’s OFDI to LAC is less than $1 billion annually, i.e., 10 times less than registered by ECLAC (2015).
20 Enrique Dussel Peters, “Characteristics of Chinese Overseas Foreign Direct Investment in Latin America (2000-2012),” Contemporary International Relations, vol. 23, no. 5, pp. 105-129.
21 CBCC (China-Brazil Business Council), Brazilian Companies in China: Presence and Experience (CBCC, Sao Paulo, 2012); Enrique Dussel Peters, “Mexican Firms Investing in China 2000-2011,” IDB Discussion Paper DP-255.
22 Kevin P. Gallagher and Margaret Myers, “China-Latin America Finance Database,” 2015, http://www.thedialogue.org/map_list/.
23 Leonardo Stanley, “El proceso de internacionalización del RMB y el nuevo protagonismo del sistema financiero chino,” in Enrique Dussel Peters, ed., América Latina y el Caribe–China. Economía, comercio e inversiones (RED ALC-CHINA, UDUAL and UNAM-CECHIMEX, México), pp. 147-169.
24 Bettina Gransow, “Chinese Infrastructure Investment in Latin America. An Assessment of Strategies, Actors and Risks,” in Enrique Dussel Peters and Ariel Armony, eds., Latin America-China Beyond Raw Materials. Who Are the Actors? (FES, RED ALC-CHINA, UNAM-CECHIMEX, Mexico, forthcoming in 2015).
25 Gallagher and Myers, 2015.
26 Chun Zhang, “Social Instability Is the Main Threat to China’s Overseas Investments,” Chinadialogue, September 4, 2014.
27 Yuzhe Zhang, “With New Funds, China Hits a Silk Road Stride,” Caixin, December 3, 2014, http://english.caixin.com/2014-12- 03/100758419.html.
28 Tom Miller, “The Perils of Leadership,” GavekalDragonomics, April 14, 2015.
29 “Confucius Institute: Promoting Language, Culture and Friendliness,” Xinhua, October 2, 2006, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2006-10/02/content_5521722.htm.
30 There has been analysis regarding the downgrading of Argentina’s soya bean exports to China, including: Andrés López, Daniela Ramos and Gabriela Starobinsky, “A Study of the Impact of China’s Global Expansion on Argentina: Soybean Value Chain Analysis,” Cuadernos de Trabajo del Cechimex 2, 2010, pp. 1-28.
31 Andrés López and Daniela Ramos, “Argentina y China: nuevos encadenamientos mercantils con empresas chinas. Los casos de Huawei, CNOOC y Sinopec,” in Enrique Dussel Peters (coord.), La inversion extranjera directa de China en ALC. 10 casos de estudio (RED ALC-CHINA, UDUAL and UNAM-México, 2014), pp. 13-60.
33 José Luis Machinea and G. De León. “El impacto del tratado Roca-Runciman sobre las importaciones argentinas: ¿mito o realidad?,” forthcoming in Desarrollo Económico, 2015.
34 Ramos López y Starobinsky, 2010.
35 Henrique Altemani de Oliveira, “La relación estratégica entre Brasil y China,” in Ignacio Martínez Cortés, La relación entre América Latina y el Caribe-China. Relaciones políticas e internacionales (RED ALC-CHINA, UDUAL and UNAM-CECHIMEX, Mexico, 2013), pp. 195-226.
36 Guilhon Albuquerque, José Augusto, “Negocios chinos Brasil-China. Tres dimensiones,” in Ignacio Cortés, La relación entre América Latina y el Caribe-China. Relaciones políticas e internacionales (RED ALC-CHINA, UDUAL and UNAM-CECHIMEX, Mexico, 2013), pp. 227-242.
37 Consejo Empresarial Brasil-China (CEBC), Comercio Bilateral Brasil-China Alerta, June 2015/b.
38 CEBC, “Investimentos chineses no Brasil. Uma nova fase da relacao Brasil-China,” 2011; Alexandre de Freitas Barbosa, Angela Cristina Tepassé, and Marina Neves Biancalana, “Las relaciones económicas entre Brasil y China a partir de las empresas State Grid y Lenovo,” in Enrique Dussel Peters (coord.), América Latina y el Caribe-China. Economía, comercio e inversiones (RED ALC-CHINA, UDUAL and UNAM-Cechimex, Mexico, 2013), pp. 61-132.
39 CEBC (Consejo Empresarial Brasil-China), “Investimentos chineses no Brasil. Uma nova fase da relacao Brasil-China,” Sao Paulo, 2011.
40 “Li Keqiang Holds Talks with Brazilian President,” Xinhua, May 20, 2015, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/video/2015- 05/20/c_134254931.htm.
41 For more information the implications of the proposed transcontinental railway, see Rebecca Ray, Kevin P. Gallagher, Andres Lopez, and Cynthia Sanborn, China in Latin America: Lessons for South-South Cooperation and Sustainable Development (Boston University Global Economic Governance Initiative, April 2015), http://www.bu.edu/pardeeschool/files/2014/12/Working-Group-Final-Report.pdf.
42 Rogerio Jelmayer, “China’s ICBC to Fund Brazilian Infrastructure Investments,” Wall Street Journal, May 14, 2015, http://www.wsj.com/articles/chinas-icbc-to-fund-brazilian-infrastructure-investments-1431627242.
43 “China, Brazil Launch 20-bln-USD Fund to Support Production Capacity Cooperation,” Xinhua, June 27, 2015, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2015-06/27/c_134361589.htm.
44 Pablo Spinetto and Sabrina Valle, “Petrobras Turns to China for $10 Billion to Avert Crunch,” Bloomberg, May 20, 2015, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-05-20/petrobras-turns-to-china-for-10-billion-to-avert-cash-crunch.
45 “China, Brazil Vow to Facilitate Bilateral Trade in Joint Statement,” Xinhua, May 20, 2015, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2015-05/20/c_134252880.htm.
46 Julio A. Díaz Vázquez, “Cuba: ¿patrón chino o vietnamita para actualizar el modelo económico?” in Dussel Peters, Enrique (coord.), América Latina y el Caribe-China. Economía, comercio e inversiones (RED ALC-CHINA, UDUAL and UNAM-Cechimex, Mexico, 2013), pp. 411-428.
47 José Luis Rodríguez, “Factores claves en la estrategia económica actual de Cuba (I y II),” Cubadebate (Opinión-Economía), April 21, 2015.
48 “China invertirá 120 mdd para transformar el Puerto de Santiago en Cuba,” El Economista, May 25, 2015, http://eleconomista.com.mx/industria-global/2015/05/25/china-invertira-120-mdd-transformar-puerto-santiago-cuba.
49 Rodríguez, 2015/a.
50 Julio A. Díaz Vázquez, “Entrevista a Prensa Latina sobre China,” forthcoming in 2015.
51 Lily Kuo, “A Sea of Chinese Tourists Is About to Flood Cuba,” Quartz, June 24, 2015, http://qz.com/435662/a-sea-of-chinese-tourists-is-about-to-descend-on-cuba/.
52 Plan Nacional de Desarrollo 2013-18. PND Mexico, 2013.
53 Dussel Peters 2014; Fernández de Castro, Rafael and Laura Rubio Díaz Leal, “Falsa illusión: China, el contrapeso de Estados Unidos en el Hemisferio Occidental,” in Enrique Dussel Peters and Yolanda Trápaga Delfín, eds., China y México. Implicaciones de una nueva relación (UNAM/Cechimex, ITESM y La Jornada, 2007), pp. 105-117.
54 Enrique Dussel Peters and Samuel Ortíz Velásquez, Monitor de la Manufactura Mexicana 11 (CECHIMEX, UNAM, 2015).
55 Enrique Dussel Peters, ed., China en América Latina: 10 casos de estudio (RED ALC-CHINA, UDUAL, UNAM/CECHIMEX, Mexico, 2015).
56 The high-speed train from Querétaro to Mexico City had a much stronger effect in the bilateral relationship. The public bidding was published in August 2014 and most stakeholders criticized the lack of time to comply with sophisticated required parameters of the projects. Mexico’s Secretary of Communication and Transportation only received one proposal from the joint venture between China Railway Construction Corporation (CRCC) with other four Mexican firms, particularly Grupo Higa; this group won the bidding process in the beginning of November. Three days later, and just a few days before President Peña Nieto’s official visit to China, he cancelled the project as a result of corruption and conflict of interest between Higa Group and the highest level of the Mexican Executive office. Public bidding was re-opened in January 2015, but, as a result of international oil price fall and subsequent fiscal limitations, the bidding was “definitively cancelled” two weeks later. Premier Li Keqiang openly questioned this decision in Mexico, and CRCC, as of May 2015, has requested compensation for the costs of the project.
57 Dussel Peters and Gallagher, 2013.
58 Dussel Peters and Gallagher, 2013.
59 Such is the case, for example, of the Chicoasén II power plant in Chiapas. In partnership with a group of Mexican firms, Sinohydro won the public bidding process in January 2015. The project, however, has had substantial delays as a result of problems with unions and local communities.
60 Prudence Ho, “Venezuela Oil Loans Go Awry for China,” Wall Street Journal, June 18, 2015, http://www.wsj.com/articles/venezuela-oil-loans-go-awry-for-china-1434656360.
61 Sources on the specific repayments of debt by oil differ significantly. See “Maduro sella en China relación estratégica con millonarias inversiones,” El Universal, September 22, 2013, http://www.eluniversal.com/nacional-y-politica/130922/maduro-sella-en-china-relacion-estrategica-con-millonarias-inversiones.
62 China’s relatively heavy and acidic oil, in addition to high transportation costs and already existing refineries in Louisiana and Texas, make exports from Venezuela to China rather challenging. Matt Ferchen, “Crude Complications: Venezuela, China, and the United States,” Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for Global Policy, October 23, 2014, http://carnegietsinghua.org/publications/?fa=56996.
63 Hongbo Sun, “The Sino-Venezuelan Oil Cooperation Model: Actors and Relationships,” in Enrique Dussel Peters and Ariel Armony, eds., Beyond Raw Materials. Who Are the Actors in the Latin America-China Relationship? (Nueva Sociedad, UNAM-CECHIMEX and University of Pittsburgh-CLAS, Buenos Aires, forthcoming in 2015).
64 Zachary Keck, “China to Invest $28 Billion in Venezuelan Oil,” Diplomat, September 13. 2013, http://thediplomat.com/2013/09/china-to-invest-28-billion-in-venezuelan-oil/.
65Enrique Dussel Peters, ed., China en América Latina: 10 casos de estudio (RED ALC-CHINA, UDUAL, UNAM/CECHIMEX, Mexico, 2015).
66 Agendasia, “Agenda estratégica México-China. Dirigido al C. Presidente Electo Enrique Peña Nieto,” Mexico, 2012.